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This paper reviews the recent literature on the production of skills of young persons. The literature
features the multiplicity of skills that explain success in a variety of life outcomes. Noncognitive skills
play a fundamental role in successful lives. The dynamics of skill formation reveal the interplay of
cognitive and noncognitive skills, and the presence of critical and sensitive periods in the life-cycle.
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Abstract
This paper reviews the recent literature on the production of skills of young
persons. The literature features the multiplicity of skills that explain success
in a variety of life outcomes. Noncognitive skills play a fundamental role in
successful lives. The dynamics of skill formation reveal the interplay of
cognitive and noncognitive skills, and the presence of critical and sensitive
periods in the life-cycle. We discuss the optimal timing of investment over
the life-cycle.
Introduction
It is well documented that people have diverse abilities, that these abilities account for a
substantial portion of the variation across people in socioeconomic success, and that persistent and
substantial ability gaps across children from various socioeconomic groups emerge before they start
school. The family plays a powerful role in shaping these abilities through genetics and parental
investments and through choice of child environments. A variety of intervention studies indicate
that ability gaps in children from dierent socioeconomic groups can be reduced if remediation is
attempted at early ages. The remediation eorts that appear to be most eective are those that sup-
This paper was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (SES-0241858, SES-0099195, SES-
0452089, SES-0752699); the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development(R01HD43411); the J. B.
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plement family environments for disadvantaged children. Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, & Masterov
(2006), henceforth CHLM, present a comprehensive survey and discussion of this literature.
This paper uses a simple economic model of skill formation to organize this and other evidence
summarized here and the ndings of related literatures in psychology, education, and neuroscience.
The existing economic models of child development treat childhood as a single period (see, e.g.,
Becker & Tomes, 1986; Aiyagari, Greenwood, & Seshadri, 2002; Benabou, 2002). The implicit
assumption in this approach is that inputs into the production of skills at dierent stages of child-
hood are perfect substitutes. Instead, we argue that to account for a large body of evidence, it is
important to build a model of skill formation with multiple stages of childhood, where inputs at
dierent stages are complements and where there is self-productivity of investment. In addition,
to rationalize the evidence, it is important to recognize three distinct credit constraints operating
on the family and its children. The rst constraint is the inability of a child to choose its parents.
This is the fundamental constraint imposed by the accident of birth. Second is the inability of
parents to borrow against their children's future income to nance investments in them. The third
constraint is the inability of parents to borrow against their own income to nance investments in
their children.
This paper summarizes ndings from the recent literature on child development and presents a
model that explains them. A model that is faithful to the evidence must recognize that (a) parental
inuences are key factors governing child development; (b) early childhood investments must be
distinguished from late childhood investments; (c) an equity-eciency trade-o exists for late in-
vestments, but not for early investments; (d) abilities are created, not solely inherited, and are
multiple in variety; (e) the traditional ability-skills dichotomy is misleading because both skills and
abilities are created; and (f) the \nature versus nurture" distinction is obsolete. These insights
change the way we interpret evidence and design policy about investing in children. Point (a) is
emphasized in many papers. Point (b) is ignored in models that consider only one period of child-
hood investment. Points (c), (d), and (e) have received scant attention in the formal literature on
child investment. Point (f) is ignored in the literature that partitions the variance of child outcomes
into components due to nature and components due to nurture.
Observations About Human Diversity and Human Development and Some
Facts Our Model Explains
Any analysis of human development must reckon with three empirically well-established ob-
servations about ability. The rst observation is that ability matters. A large number of empirical
studies document that cognitive ability is a powerful determinant of wages, schooling, participation
in crime, and success in many aspects of social and economic life. The frenzy generated by Richard
J. Herrnstein and Charles A. Murray's book, The Bell Curve, because of its claims of genetic de-
terminism, obscured its real message, which is that cognitive ability is an important predictor of
socioeconomic success. (See, e.g., Heckman, 1995, and Murnane, Willett, & Levy, 1995.)
A second observation, more recently established, is that abilities are multiple in nature.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 3
Noncognitive abilities (perseverance, motivation, time preference, risk aversion, self-esteem, self-
control, preference for leisure) have direct eects on wages (controlling for schooling), schooling,
teenage pregnancy, smoking, crime, performance on achievement tests, and many other aspects of
social and economic life (Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, & ter Weel, 2008; Bowles, Gintis, &
Osborne, 2001; Heckman, Stixrud, & Urzua, 2006).
The third observation is that the nature versus nurture distinction is obsolete. The modern
literature on epigenetic expression teaches us that the sharp distinction between acquired skills
and ability featured in the early human capital literature is not tenable (see, e.g., Gluckman &
Hanson, 2005, and Rutter, 2006).1 Additive \nature" and \nurture" models, while traditional
and still used in many studies of heritability and family inuence, mischaracterize how ability is
manifested. Abilities are produced, and gene expression is governed, by environmental conditions
(Rutter, 2006). Measured abilities are susceptible to environmental inuences, including in utero
experiences, and also have genetic components. These factors interact to produce behaviors and
abilities that have both a genetic and an acquired character.2;3 Genes and environment cannot be
meaningfully parsed by traditional linear models that assign variance to each component.
Taking these observations as established, we develop a simple economic model to explain the
following six facts from the recent empirical literature. First, ability gaps between individuals and
across socioeconomic groups open up at early ages, for both cognitive and noncognitive skills. See
Figure 1 for a prototypical gure which graphs a cognitive test score by age of child by socioeconomic
status of the family.4 CHLM present many additional graphs of child cognitive and noncognitive
skills by age showing early divergence and then near parallelism during school-going years across
children with parents of dierent socioeconomic status. Levels of child skills are highly correlated
with family background factors like parental education and maternal ability, which, when statis-
tically controlled for, largely eliminate these gaps (see Carneiro & Heckman, 2003, and CHLM).
Experimental interventions with long-term follow-up conrm that changing the resources available
to disadvantaged children improves their adult outcomes. See the studies surveyed in CHLM or
Blau & Currie (2006). Schooling quality and school resources have relatively small eects on abil-
ity decits and have little eect on test scores by age across children from dierent socioeconomic
groups, as displayed in Figure 1 and related graphs (see Heckman, Larenas, & Urzua, 2004, and
Raudenbush, 2006).
Second, in both animal and human species, there is compelling evidence of critical and sen-
sitive periods in the development of the child. Some skills or traits are more readily acquired at
certain stages of childhood than other traits (see the evidence summarized in Knudsen, Heckman,
1For example, Becker (1993, pp. 99{100) contrasts the implications for the earnings distribution of ability models
of earnings and human capital models, claiming the latter are more consistent with the empirical evidence on earnings.
The implicit assumption in his analysis and the literature it spawned is that ability is determined by \nature", i.e.,
is genetic, and outside the inuence of family investment strategies.
2There is some evidence that gene expression aected by environment is heritable (see Rutter, 2006).
3Some recent evidence on gene-environment interactions resulting from child maltreatment is presented in Caspi,
McClay, Mott, Mill, Martin, Craig et al. (2002). Rutter (2006) surveys this evidence.
4Permanent income is the measure of socioeconomic status in this gure. See CHLM for the source of this gure
and the precise denition of permanent income.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 4
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Cameron, & Shonko, 2006). For example, on average, if a second language is learned before age
12, the child speaks it without an accent (Newport, 1990). If syntax and grammar are not acquired
early on, they appear to be very dicult to learn later on in life (Pinker, 1994). A child born with
a cataract will be blind if the cataract is not removed within the rst year of life.
Dierent types of abilities appear to be manipulable at dierent ages. IQ scores become
stable by age 10 or so, suggesting a sensitive period for their formation below age 10. (See Hopkins
& Bracht, 1975.) There is evidence that adolescent interventions can aect noncognitive skills (see
CHLM). This evidence is supported by the neuroscience that establishes the malleability of the
prefrontal cortex into the early 20s (Dahl, 2004). This is the region of the brain that governs
emotion and self-regulation.
On average, the later remediation is given to a disadvantaged child, the less eective it
is. A study by O'Connor, Rutter, Beckett, Keaveney, Kreppner, & the English and Romanian
Adoptees Study Team (2000) of adopted Romanian infants reared in severely deprived orphanage
environments before being adopted supports this claim. The later the Romanian orphan was
rescued from the social, emotional and cognitive isolation of the orphanage, the lower was his or
her cognitive performance at age 6. Classroom remediation programs designed to combat early
cognitive decits have a poor track record.
At historically funded levels, public job training programs and adult literacy and educational
programs, like the GED, that attempt to remediate years of educational and emotional neglect
among disadvantaged individuals have a low economic return and produce meager eects for most
persons. A substantial body of evidence suggests that returns to adolescent education for the mostINVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 5
disadvantaged and less able are lower than the returns for the more advantaged (Meghir & Palme,
2001; Carneiro & Heckman, 2003, and the evidence they cite; Carneiro, Heckman, & Vytlacil,
2006).
The available evidence suggests that for many skills and abilities, later remediation for early
disadvantage to achieve a given level of adult performance may be possible, but is much more
costly than early remediation (Cunha & Heckman, 2007). The economic returns to job training,
high school graduation, and college attendance are lower for less able persons. (See Carneiro &
Heckman, 2003.)
Third, despite the low returns to interventions targeted toward disadvantaged adolescents, the
empirical literature shows high economic returns for remedial investments in young disadvantaged
children (see Barnett (2004), the evidence in CHLM, and the papers they cite). This nding
is a consequence of dynamic complementarity and self-productivity captured by the technology
developed in the next section.
Fourth, if early investment in disadvantaged children is not followed up by later investment,
its eect at later ages is lessened. Investments appear to be complementary and require follow-up
to be eective. Currie & Thomas (1995) document a decline in the performance of Head Start5
minority participants after they leave the program, return to disadvantaged environments, and
receive the low levels of investment experienced by many disadvantaged children.6
Fifth, the eects of credit constraints on a child's outcomes when the child reaches adulthood
depend on the age at which they bind for the child's family. Recent research summarized in Carneiro
& Heckman (2002, 2003) and in CHLM demonstrates the quantitative insignicance of family
credit constraints in the child's college-going years in explaining a child's enrollment in college.
Controlling for cognitive ability, under meritocratic policies currently in place in American society,
family income during the child's college-going years plays only a minor role in determining child
college participation, although much public policy is predicated on precisely the opposite point of
view. Holding ability xed, minorities are more likely to attend college than others despite their
lower family incomes (see Cameron & Heckman, 2001, and the references they cite). Augmenting
family income or reducing college tuition at the stage of the life cycle when a child goes to college
does not go far in compensating for low levels of previous investment.
Carneiro and Heckman present evidence for the United States that only a small fraction
(at most 8%) of the families of adolescents are credit constrained in making college participation
decisions. This evidence is supported in research by Cameron & Taber (2004) and Stinebrickner &
Stinebrickner (2008). Permanent family income plays an important role in explaining educational
choices, insofar as it is a proxy for the high level of investment in abilities and skills that wealthier
families provide, but it is not synonymous with family income in the adolescent years, nor with
5Head Start is a national program targeted to low-income pre-school aged children (ages 3{5) that promotes
school readiness by enhancing their social and cognitive development through the provision of educational, health,
nutritional, social and other services to enrolled children and families. There is a new program, Early Head Start,
that begins at age 1.
6Currie & Thomas (2000) present additional analyses of the Head Start program.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 6
tuition and fees.
There is some evidence, however, that credit constraints operating in the early years have
eects on adult ability and schooling outcomes (Dahl & Lochner, 2005; Duncan & Brooks-Gunn,
1997; Duncan & Kalil, 2006; Morris, Duncan, & Clark-Kauman, 2005). Carneiro & Heckman
(2003) show that controlling for family permanent income reduces the estimated eect of early
income on child outcomes. Permanent income has a strong eect on child outcomes. The strongest
evidence for an eect of the timing of parental income for disadvantaged children is in their early
years. The best documented market failure in the life cycle of skill formation in contemporary
American society is the inability of children to buy their parents or the lifetime resources that
parents provide and not the inability of families to secure loans for a child's education when the
child is an adolescent.
Sixth, socioemotional (noncognitive) skills foster cognitive skills and are an important product
of successful families and successful interventions in disadvantaged families. Emotionally nurturing
environments produce more capable learners. The Perry Preschool Program,7 which was evaluated
by random assignment, did not boost participant adult IQ but enhanced performance of partici-
pants on a number of dimensions, including scores on achievement tests, employment, and reduced
participation in a variety of social pathologies. See Schweinhart, Montie, Xiang, Barnett, Beleld,
& Nores (2005).
A Model of Skill Formation
We now develop a model of skill formation that can explain the six facts just presented as
well as additional ndings from the literature on child development. We use the terms skill and
ability interchangeably. Both are produced by environments, investment, and genes.
Agents possess a vector of abilities at each age. These abilities (or skills) are multiple in
nature and range from pure cognitive abilities (e.g., IQ) to noncognitive abilities (patience, self-
control, temperament, risk aversion, time preference). These abilities are used with dierent weights
in dierent tasks in the labor market and in social life more generally.8 Achievement test scores,
sometimes confused with IQ scores (e.g., Herrnstein & Murray, 1994), are not pure measures of
ability and are aected by cognitive, noncognitive and environmental inputs. (See, e.g., Hansen,
Heckman, & Mullen, 2004, and Heckman, Stixrud, & Urzua, 2006.)
The human skill-formation process is governed by a multistage technology. Each stage corre-
sponds to a period in the life cycle of a child. Although the child development literature recognizes
stages of development (see, e.g., Erikson, 1950), the economics of child development does not. In-
puts or investments at each stage produce outputs at the next stage. Like Ben-Porath (1967), we
7The Perry Preschool Program was an intensive family-enhancement preschool program administered to randomly
selected disadvantaged black children enrolled in the program over ve dierent waves between 1962 and 1967.
Children were enrolled 2
1
2 hours per day, 5 days a week, during the school year and there were weekly 1
1
2-hour
home visits. They were treated for 2 years, ages 3 and 4. A control group provides researchers with an appropriate
benchmark to evaluate the eects of the preschool program.
8CHLM briey discuss the evidence on this point and suggest a model of comparative advantage in occupational
choice to supplement their model of skill formation.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 7
use a production function to determine the relationship between inputs and the output of skill.
Unlike Ben-Porath, in our model qualitatively dierent inputs can be used at dierent stages and
the technologies can be dierent at dierent stages of child development.
Ben-Porath focuses on adult investments where time and its opportunity cost play important
roles. For child investments, parents make decisions and child opportunity costs are less relevant.
The outputs at each stage in our technology are the levels of each skill achieved at that stage. Some
stages of the technology may be more productive in producing some skills than other stages, and
some inputs may be more productive at some stages than at other stages. The stages that are more
eective in producing certain skills are called \sensitive periods" for the acquisition of those skills.
If one stage alone is eective in producing a skill (or ability), it is called a \critical period" for that
skill.
An important feature of our technology is that the skills produced at one stage augment the
skills attained at later stages. This eect is termed self-productivity. It embodies the idea that
skills acquired in one period persist into future periods. It also embodies the idea that skills are
self-reinforcing and cross-fertilizing. For example, emotional security fosters more vigorous learning
of cognitive skills. This has been found in animal species (Suomi, 1999; Meaney, 2001; Cameron,
2004) and in humans (Duncan, Dowsett, Claessens, Magnuson, Huston, Klebanov et al., 2007;
Raver, Garner, & Smith-Donald, 2007, interpreting the ability of a child to pay attention as a
socioemotional skill). A higher stock of cognitive skill in one period raises the stock of next period
cognitive skills. A second key feature of skill formation is dynamic complementarity. Skills produced
at one stage raise the productivity of investment at subsequent stages. In a multistage technology,
complementarity implies that levels of skill investments at dierent ages bolster each other. They
are synergistic. Complementarity also implies that early investment should be followed up by later
investment in order for the early investment to be productive. Together, dynamic complementarity
and self-productivity produce multiplier eects which are the mechanisms through which skills
beget skills and abilities beget abilities.
Dynamic complementarity, self-productivity of human capital, and multiplier eects imply an
equity-eciency trade-o for late child investments but not for early investments. These concepts,
embedded in alternative market settings, explain the six facts from the recent literature summarized
in the previous section. These features of the technology of skill formation have consequences for the
design and evaluation of public policies toward families. In particular, they show why the returns to
late childhood investment and remediation for young adolescents from disadvantaged backgrounds
are so low, while the returns to early investment in children from disadvantaged environments are
so high.
We now formalize these concepts in an overlapping generations model. An individual lives
for 2T years. The rst T years the individual is a child of an adult parent. From age T + 1 to
2T the individual lives as an adult and is the parent of a child. The individual dies at the end of
the period in which he is 2T years old, just before his child's child is born. At every calendar yearINVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 8
there are an equal and large number of individuals of every age t 2 f1;2;:::;2Tg.9 To simplify the
notation, we do not explicitly subscript generations.
A household consists of an adult parent and his child. Parents invest in their children because
of altruism. They have common preferences and supply labor inelastically. Let It denote parental
investments in child skill when the child is t years old, where t = 1;2;:::;T. The output of the
investment process is a skill vector. The parent is assumed to fully control the investments in
the skills of the child, whereas in reality, as a child matures, he gains much more control over the
investment process.10 We ignore investments in the child's adult years to focus on new ideas in
this paper. We also keep government inputs (e.g., schooling) implicit. They can be modeled as a
component of It.
We now describe how skills evolve over time. Assume that each agent is born with initial
conditions 1. Let h denote parental characteristics (e.g., IQ, education, etc.). At each stage t, let
t denote the vector of skill stocks. The technology of production of skill when the child is t years
old is
t+1 = ft (h;t;It); (1)
for t = 1;2;:::;T. We assume that ft is strictly increasing and strictly concave in It, and twice
continuously dierentiable in all of its arguments.11
Technology (1) is written in recursive form. Substituting in (1) for t, t 1;:::, repeatedly,
one can rewrite the stock of skills at stage t + 1, t+1, as a function of all past investments:
t+1 = mt (h;1;I1;:::;It); t = 1;:::;T: (2)
Dynamic complementarity arises when @2ft (h;t;It)=@t@I0
t > 0, (i.e., when stocks of skills ac-
quired by period t   1 (t) make investment in period t (It) more productive). Such complemen-
tarity explains why returns to educational investments are higher at later stages of the child's life
cycle for more able children (those with higher t). Students with greater early skills (cognitive
and noncognitive) are more ecient in later learning of both cognitive and noncognitive skills. The
evidence from the early intervention literature suggests that the enriched early preschool environ-
ments provided by the Abecedarian,12 the Perry Preschool Program, and the Chicago Child-Parent
Center (CPC)13 interventions promote greater eciency in learning in school and reduce problem
9We develop our formal OLG model in Cunha & Heckman (2007).
10A sketch of such a model is discussed in Carneiro, Cunha, & Heckman (2003).
11These conditions are sucient. There is no need for a dierentiability requirement for h, and the dierentiability
requirement with respect to t can be weakened.
12The Abecedarian Project recruited children born between 1972 and 1977 whose families scored high on a \High
Risk" index. It enrolls and enriches the family environments of disadvantaged children beginning a few months after
birth and continuing until age 5. At age 5|just as they were about to enter kindergarten|all of the children were
reassigned to either a school age intervention through age 8 or to a control group. The Abecedarian program was
more intensive than the Perry program. Its preschool program was a year-round, full-day intervention.
13The CPC was started in 1967, in selected public schools serving impoverished neighborhoods of Chicago. Using
federal funds, the center provided half-day preschool program for disadvantaged 3- and 4-year-olds during the 9
months that they were in school. In 1978, state funding became available, and the program was extended through
third grade and included full-day kindergarten.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 9
behaviors (see Blau & Currie (2006) and CHLM).
Self-productivity arises when @ft (h;t;It)=@t > 0 (i.e., when higher stocks of skills in one
period create higher stocks of skills in the next period). For the case of skill vectors, this includes
own- and cross-eects. The joint eects of self-productivity and dynamic complementarity help to
explain the high productivity of investment in disadvantaged young children, and the lower return
to investment in disadvantaged adolescent children for whom the stock of skills is low and hence
the complementarity eect is lower. These are facts 2 and 3 presented in the \Observations About
Human Diversity and Human Development and Some Facts Our Model Explains" Section.
This technology is suciently rich to describe learning in rodents and macaque monkeys.
More emotionally secure young animals explore their environments more actively and learn more
quickly. This technology also explains the evidence that the ability of the child to pay attention
aects subsequent academic achievement. Cross-complementarity serves to explain fact 6. This
technology also captures the critical and sensitive periods in humans and animals documented by
Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, & Shonko (2006). We now dene these concepts precisely.













> 0 for some h;1;I1;:::;It:
This condition says that investments in t+1 are productive in period t but not in any other period















In words, period t is a sensitive period relative to period s if, at the same level of inputs, investment
is more productive in stage t than in another stage s 6= t.14
Suppose for simplicity that T = 2. In reality, there are many stages in childhood, including
in utero experiences.15 Assume that 1, I1, and I2 are scalars.16 The adult stock of skills, h0 (= 3),
is a function of parental characteristics, initial conditions, and investments during childhood I1 and
I2:
h0 = m2 (h;1;I1;I2): (3)
The literature in economics assumes only one period of childhood. It does not distinguish
between early investment and late investment. This produces the conventional specication which
14See CHLM for a denition of critical and sensitive periods in terms of technology (1).
15Our technology applies to in utero and post-natal investments as well. See Shonko & Phillips (2000) for evidence
on the importance of such investments.
16CHLM analyze the vector case.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 10
is a special case of technology (3), where
h0 = m2 (h;1;I1 + (1   )I2) (4)
and  = 1=2. In this case, adult stocks of skills do not depend on how investments are distributed
over dierent periods of childhood. For example, take two children, A and B, who have identical
parents and the same initial condition 1, but have dierent investment proles: Child A receives
no investment in period 1 and receives I units of investment in period 2, IA
1 = 0, IA
2 = I, while
child B receives I units of investment in period 1 and zero units of investment in period 2, IB
1 = I,
IB
2 = 0. According to (4), when  = 1=2, children A and B will have the same stocks of skills as
adults. The timing of investment is irrelevant. Neither period 1 nor period 2 is critical.
The polar opposite of perfect substitution is perfect complementarity:
h0 = m2 (h;1;minfI1;I2g): (5)
Technology (5) has the feature that adult stocks of skills critically depend on how investments are
distributed over time. For example, if investment in period 1 is zero, I1 = 0, then it does not pay
to invest in period 2. If late investment is zero, I2 = 0, it does not pay to invest early. For the
technology of skill formation dened by (5), the best strategy is to distribute investments evenly,
so that I1 = I2. Complementarity has a dual face. It is essential to invest early to get satisfactory
adult outcomes. But it is also essential to invest late to harvest the fruits of the early investment.17
Such dynamic complementarity helps to explain the evidence by Currie & Thomas (1995) that
for disadvantaged minority students, early investments through Head Start have weak eects in
later years if not followed up by later investments. This is fact 4 on our list. Our explanation is
in sharp contrast to the one oered by Becker (1991), who explains weak Head Start eects by
crowding out of parental investment by public investment. That is a story of substitution against
the child who receives investment in a one-period model of childhood. Ours is a story of dynamic
complementarity.18
A more general technology that captures technologies (4) and (5) as special cases is a standard












for   1 and 0    1. The CES share parameter  is a skill multiplier. It reveals the productivity
of early investment not only in directly boosting h0 (through self-productivity) but also in raising
the productivity of I2 by increasing 2 through rst-period investments. Thus I1 directly increases
2 which in turn aects the productivity of I2 in forming h0.  captures the net eect of I1 on h0
through both self-productivity and direct complementarity.
17Both periods are critical. Note that in this case the production function is not strictly dierentiable as required
in our denition. Our denition can be extended to deal with this limit case.
18We oer another explanation of the apparently weak Head Start eects below.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 11
The elasticity of substitution 1=(1   ) is a measure of how easy it is to substitute between
I1 and I2. For a CES technology,  represents the degree of complementarity (or substitutability)
between early and late investment in producing skills. The parameter  governs how easy it is to
compensate for low levels of stage 1 skills in producing later skills.
When  is small, low levels of early investment I1 are not easily remediated by later investment
I2 in producing human capital. The other face of CES complementarity is that when  is small,
high early investment should be followed with high late investment if the early investment is to be
harvested. In the extreme case when  !  1, (6) converges to (5). This technology explains facts
2 and 3|why returns to education are low in the adolescent years for disadvantaged (low h, low
I1, low 2) adolescents but are high in the early years. Without the proper foundation for learning
(high levels of 2) in technology (1), adolescent interventions have low returns.
In a one-period model of childhood, inputs at any stage of childhood are perfect substitutes.
Application of the one-period model supports the widely held but empirically unsupported intuition
that diminishing returns make investment in less advantaged adolescents more productive. As noted
in fact 2 of the \Observations About Human Diversity and Human Development and Some Facts
Our Model Explains" Section, the evidence suggests that just the opposite is true. We next embed
the technology in a market environment with parental choice of inputs.
The Optimal Life Cycle Prole of Investments
Using technology (6), we now show how the ratio of early to late investments varies as a
function of  and  as a consequence of parental choices in dierent market settings. Let w and r
denote the wage and interest rates, respectively, in a stationary environment. At the beginning of
adulthood, the parent draws the initial level of skill of the child, 1, from the distribution J(1).
On reaching adulthood, the parent receives bequest b. The state variables for the parent are the
parental skills, h, the parental nancial resources, b, and the initial skill level of the child, 1. Let
c1 and c2 denote the consumption of the household in the rst and second period of the life cycle of
the child, respectively. The parent decides how to allocate the resources among consumption and
investments at dierent periods as well as bequests b0 which may be positive or negative. Assuming
that human capital (parental and child) is scalar, the budget constraint is:










Let  denote the utility discount factor and  denote the parental altruism toward the child.
Let u() denote the utility function. The recursive formulation of the problem of the parent is:
V (h;b;1) = max









The problem of the parent is to maximize (8) subject to (7) and technology (6).
When  = 1, so early and late investment are perfect CES substitutes, the optimal investment
strategy is straightforward. The price of early investment is $1. The price of the late investmentINVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 12
is $1=(1 + r). Thus the parent can purchase (1 + r) units of I2 for every unit of I1. The amount
of human capital produced from one unit of I1 is , while $(1 + r) of I2 produces (1 + r)(1   )
units of human capital. Thus, two forces act in opposite directions. High productivity of initial
investment (the skill multiplier ) drives the parent toward making early investments. The interest
rate drives the parent to invest late. It is optimal to invest early if  > (1   )(1 + r).
As  !  1, the CES production function converges to the Leontief case and the optimal
investment strategy is to set I1 = I2. In this case, investment in the young is essential. At the
same time, later investment is needed to harvest early investment. On eciency grounds, early
disadvantages should be perpetuated, and compensatory investments at later ages are economically
inecient.
For  1 <  < 1, the rst-order conditions are necessary and sucient given concavity of
the technology in terms of I1 and I2. For an interior solution, we can derive the optimal ratio of










Figure 2 plots the ratio of early to late investment as a function of the skill multiplier  under
dierent values of the complementarity parameter , assuming r = 0. When  !  1, the ratio is
not sensitive to variations in . When  = 0, the function (6) is









In this case, from equation (9), the optimal I1=I2 is close to zero for low values of , but explodes
to innity as  approaches one.
When CES complementarity is high, the skill multiplier  plays a limited role in shaping the
ratio of early to late investment. High early investment should be followed by high late investment.
As the degree of CES complementarity decreases, the role of the skill multiplier increases, and the
higher the multiplier, the more investment should be concentrated in the early ages.
In a perfect credit market model, optimal investment levels are not aected by parental wages
or endowments, or the parameters that characterize the utility function u().19 Note, however, that
even in this \perfect" credit market setting, parental investments depend on parental skills, h;
because these characteristics aect the returns to investment. From the point of view of the child,
this is a market failure due to the accident of birth. Children would like to choose the optimal
amount of parental characteristics h to complement their initial endowment, 1.20
Consider the second credit constraint mentioned in the introduction: parental bequests must
be non-negative, i.e., parents cannot leave debts to their children. The problem of the parent is to
19We refer to parental resources specic to a given generation.
20This thought experiment is whimsical. If parents create the child, through genes and environment, the child is
not an independent actor. Under a homunculus theory, the child would have an identity independent of the parent.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 13
Figure 2. Ratio of early to late investment in human capital as a function of the ratio of rst period to
second period investment productivity for dierent values of the complementarity parameter.





















Figure 2: Ratio of early to late investment in human capital 
as a function of the ratio of first period to second period investment productivity 
for different values of the complementarity parameter
Note: Assumes r = 0.
Source: Cunha and Heckman (2007).
maximize (8) subject to (7), technology (6), and the liquidity constraint:
b0  0: (10)
If constraint (10) binds, then early investment under lifetime liquidity constraints, ^ I1; is lower
than the early investment under the perfect credit market model, denoted I
1. The same is true for
late investment: ^ I2 < I
2. Under this type of market imperfection, underinvestment in skills starts
at early ages and continues throughout the life cycle of the child. This explains fact 1|that skill
gaps open up early and are perpetuated.21
In this second case, both early and late investment depend on parental initial wealth b for
the families for whom the constraint (10) binds. Children who come from constrained families
21Of course other reasons why skill gaps open up early and are perpetuated is variation in h and 1, the parental
environmental and initial endowment variables, respectively.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 14
with lower b will have lower early and late investment. Interventions that occur at early stages
would exhibit high returns, especially if they are followed up with resources to supplement late
investment. Once the early stage investment is realized, however, late remediation for disadvantaged
children would produce lower returns if early and late investment are not perfect substitutes and
late investment is more productive the higher the level of early investment. This helps to explain
fact 5 in the \Observations About Human Diversity and Human Development and Some Facts Our
Model Explains" Section.
The eects of government policies on promoting the accumulation of human capital depend
on the complementarity between early and late investment as well as on whether the policies were
anticipated by parents or not. For example, the short-run eects of an unanticipated policy that
subsidizes late investment will have weaker eects the greater the complementarity between early
and late investment. If the technology is Leontief, there is no short-run impact of the policy on
adolescent investment. At the time the policy is announced, poor parents have already made their
early investment decisions and, in the Leontief case, it is not possible to compensate by increasing
late investment as a response to the subsidy.
There is, however, a long-run eect of the policy. If the policy is a permanent change an-
nounced before the child is born, new parents will adjust both early and late investment in response
to the subsidy to late investment. Note that the same is true for an exogenous increase in the return
to education. If there is strong complementarity between early and late investment, in the short
run we would expect weak reactions to the increase in returns to education as gauged by adolescent
investment decisions for the children from very poor family backgrounds, but stronger reactions
in the long run. This analysis provides an explanation for why the college enrollment response to
unanticipated increases in the returns to college were initially so strong for adolescents from ad-
vantaged families and initially so weak for adolescents from less advantaged families. Adolescents
from less advantaged families are more likely to lack the foundational skills that make college going
productive, compared to adolescents from more advantaged families.
There is no trade-o between equity and eciency in early childhood investment. Government
policies to promote early accumulation of human capital should be targeted to the children of
poor families. However, the optimal second-period intervention for a child from a disadvantaged
environment depends critically on the nature of technology (6). If I1 and I2 are perfect CES
complements, then a low level of I1 cannot be compensated at any level of investment by a high
I2. On the other hand, suppose that  = 1, so the technology m2 can be written with inputs
as perfect CES substitutes. In this case, a second-period intervention can, in principle, eliminate
initial skill decits (low values of I1). At a suciently high level of second-period investment, it is
technically possible to oset low rst-period investment, but it may not be cost eective to do so.
If  is suciently low relative to r, it is more ecient to postpone investment.
The concepts of critical and sensitive periods are dened in terms of the technical possibilities
of remediation. Many noneconomists frame the question of remediation for adverse environments
in terms of what is technically possible|not what is economically ecient. Our analysis considersINVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 15
both technological possibilities and costs. From an economic point of view, critical and sensitive
periods should be dened in terms of the costs and returns of remediation, and not solely in terms
of technical possibilities.
Another source of market failure arises when parents are subject to lifetime liquidity con-
straints and constraints that prevent parents from borrowing against their own future labor income,
which may aect their ability to nance investment in the child's early years.22 This is the third
constraint considered in the introduction. To analyze this case, assume that parental productivity
grows exogenously at rate . Let s denote parental savings. We write the constraints facing the
parent at each stage of the life cycle of the child as:
c1 + I1 +
s
(1 + r)
= wh + b (rst stage)
c2 + I2 +
b0
(1 + r)
= w(1 + )h + s (second stage)
where s  0 and b0  0. The restriction s  0 says that the parent cannot borrow income from
their old age to nance consumption and investment when the child is in the rst stage of the life
cycle. Some parents may be willing to do this, especially when  is high. In the case when s  0
and b0  0 bind, and investments in dierent periods are not perfect substitutes, the timing of






(1   )(1 + r)
 1
1  
(wh + b   I1)




If early income is low with respect to late income, the ratio I1=I2 will be lower than the optimal
ratio. The deviation from the optimal ratio will be larger the lower the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of consumption (captured by the parameter ). Early income would not matter if
 = 1; which would be the case when consumption in stage 1 is a perfect substitute for consumption
in stage 2. Substitutability through parental preferences can undo lack of substitutability in the
technology of skill formation.
Our analysis of credit constrained families joined with a low value of  interprets the evidence
presented by Duncan & Brooks-Gunn (1997), Morris, Duncan, & Clark-Kauman (2005), Duncan
& Kalil (2006), and Dahl & Lochner (2005) that the level of family income in the early stages of
childhood has some eect on the level of ability and achievement of the children. This is fact 5 of
the \Observations About Human Diversity and Human Development and Some Facts Our Model
Explains" Section. Our analysis also interprets the evidence of Carneiro & Heckman (2002) and
Cameron & Taber (2004) that, conditioning on child ability, family income in the adolescent years
has only a minor eect on adolescent schooling choices.
22This type of constraint is also analyzed by Caucutt & Lochner (2004).INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 16
Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation
A large body of research documents the socio-emotional basis of reason (see Damasio, 1994,
and LeDoux, 1996). Our analysis goes beyond this literature to formalize a body of evidence that
emotional skills promote learning. Mechanisms relating cortisol to stress and the eects of cortisol
on the brain development of animals have been documented by Suomi (1999) and Meaney (2001).
Duncan, Dowsett, Claessens, Magnuson, Huston, Klebanov et al. (2007) and Raver, Garner, &
Smith-Donald (2007) show that a child's ability to pay attention facilitates later learning.
The framework developed in the \A Model of Skill Formation" Section readily accommodates
skill vectors. The evidence summarized in the \Observations About Human Diversity and Human
Development and Some Facts Our Model Explains" Section shows the importance of both cogni-
tive and noncognitive skills in determining adult outcomes. Child development is not just about
cognitive skill formation, although a lot of public policy analysis focuses solely on cognitive test
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to denote parental cognitive and noncognitive skills. At each stage t, we can dene a recursive








; k 2 fC;Ng: (11)
Note that technology (11) allows for cross-productivity eects: cognitive skills may aect the
accumulation of noncognitive skills and vice versa. They also allow for critical and sensitive periods
to dier by skill, as is required to account for fact 2.
If cognitive and/or noncognitive skills determine costs of eort, time preference, or risk aver-
sion parameters, parental investments aect child and adult behavior. Our analysis of preference
formation contrasts with the analyses of Akabayashi (1996) and Weinberg (2001). Those authors
build principal-agent models where the parent (the principal) and the child (the agent) agree on
contracts in which parents' nancial transfers are conditional on observable measures of eort (e.g.,
test scores in school). These contracts are designed so that the children are driven toward the level
of eort desired by the parents. In our model, parents directly shape child preferences.
Accounting for preference formation enables us to interpret the success of many early child-
hood programs targeted to disadvantaged children that do not permanently raise IQ, but which
permanently boost social performance.23 This is fact 6 of the \Observations About Human Diver-
sity and Human Development and Some Facts Our Model Explains" Section. The controversy over
Head Start fade-out may have been a consequence of relying only on cognitive measures to gauge
performance. The Perry Preschool Program had an IQ fade-out but a lasting eect on a variety of
participants through age 40. They work harder, are less likely to commit crime, and participate in
many fewer social pathologies than do control group members.24
23The Abecedarian early intervention program permanently boosted adult IQ. See CHLM.
24See Cunha & Heckman (2009). The exact mechanism by which noncognitive skills are boosted is not yet estab-
lished. It could be that noncognitive skills are created directly in the early years and persist. It could also be thatINVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 17
Estimates of the Technology
Parametric Specication
We specify the following parametric representation of equation (11). At each age t and






















































k;l = 1 for all j 2 fC;Ng;l 2 f1;:::;Lg; and t 2 f1;:::;Tg:
It is useful to consider a simpler version of (12) which one obtains if 
j
l = 0 for all j and l



















Technology (13) is estimated by Cunha & Heckman (2008). The main problem that arises
in estimating the technology is that vector (t;It) is not directly observed. Cunha & Heckman
(2008) treat (t;It) as a vector of unobserved factors and use a variety of measurements of the
latent constructs to proxy these factors. There is a substantial body of econometric work on linear
factor models (see, e.g., Aigner, Hsiao, Kapteyn, & Wansbeek, 1984). These models account for
measurement errors in the proxies which Cunha & Heckman (2008) nd to be quantitatively large.
If they are not accounted for, estimates of technology parameters are substantially biased.
In addition to the problem of measurement error, there is the problem of setting the scale
of the factors and the further problem that elements of (t;It) are likely correlated with the shock
t. Cunha & Heckman (2008) address these problems by using rich sources of panel data which
provide multiple measurements on (t;It). They use a dynamic state-space version of a MIMIC
model.25 In the linear setting, it is assumed that multiple measurements on inputs and outputs






j;t;for j 2 f1;:::;Mk
t g;k 2 fC;N;Ig; (14)
where Mk
t is the number of measurements on latent factor k and I
t is latent investment at age t.
This approach generalizes to a nonlinear semiparametric framework. Equation (12) can be
interpreted as a general nonlinear factor model dened in terms of t and It.26 Cunha, Heckman, &
Schennach (2010) generalize this framework to a nonlinear setup to identify technology (1). They
the higher early cognitive skills that fade out foster noncognitive skills that persist. Both channels of inuence could
be in operation.
25See J oreskog & Goldberger (1975) MIMIC stands for Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes. Harvey (1989)
and Durbin, Harvey, Koopman, & Shephard (2004) are standard references for dynamic state space models, which
generalize MIMIC models to a dynamic setting.
26Nonlinear factor models are generated by economic choice models where risk aversion, time preference, and leisure
preferences are low-dimensional factors that explain a variety of consumer choices.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 18
present original results on identication of dynamic factor models in nonlinear frameworks.
Model Identication
As is standard in factor analysis, Cunha & Heckman (2008) use covariance restrictions to
identify technology (13). Low dimensional (t;It) (associated with preferences, abilities, and in-
vestment) are proxied by numerous measurements for each component.
Treating each of a large number of measurements on inputs as separate inputs creates a prob-
lem for instrumental variables analyses of production functions. It is easy to run out of instruments
for each input. Such an approach likely also creates collinearity problems among the inputs.
Cunha and Heckman avoid these problems by assuming that clusters of measurements proxy
the same set of latent variables. Measurements of a common set of factors can be used as instru-
ments for other measurements on the same common set of factors. Methods based on covariance
restrictions and cross-equation restrictions provide identication and account for omitted inputs
that are correlated with included inputs. These methods provide an econometrically justied way
to aggregate inputs into low-dimensional indices.
Estimates from the Linear Model
Cunha & Heckman (2008) estimate technology (13) using a sample of white males from the
Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data (CNLSY). These data provide multiple
measurements on investments and cognitive and noncognitive skills at dierent stages of the life
cycle of the child. Table 1, extracted from their paper, reports estimates of technology (13). The
scales of the factors in t are anchored in log earnings.27 They account for endogeneity of parental
investment. Doing so substantially aects their estimates.
Their estimates show strong self-productivity eects (lagged coecients of own variables)
and strong cross-productivity of eects of noncognitive skills on cognitive skills (personality fac-
tors promote learning; those open to experience learn from it). The estimated cross-productivity
eects of cognitive skills on noncognitive skills are weak. Contrary to models in criminology and
psychology that assign no role to investment in explaining the life cycle evolution of capabilities,
Cunha & Heckman (2008) nd strong investment eects. Remediation and resilience are possible.
Capabilities evolve and are aected by parental investment. Investment aects cognitive skills more
at earlier ages than at later ages. Investment aects noncognitive skills more in middle childhood.
This evidence is consistent with the literature in neuroscience on the slow maturation of the pre-
frontal cortex which governs personality development and expression, and the emergence of more
nuanced manifestations of personality with age.
One way to interpret these estimates is to examine the impacts of investment at each age on
high school graduation and adult earnings.28 These outcomes depend dierently on cognition and
personality. Schooling attainment is more cognitively weighted than earnings.
27See Cunha & Heckman (2008) for a discussion of alternative anchors for t and It.
28Results for high school graduation as an anchor are reported in Cunha & Heckman (2008).INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 19
Table 1: Correcting for Classical Measurement Error Anchor{Log Earnings of the Child Between Ages 23-28
White Males, CNLSY.
Independent variable  Noncognitive skill ( ) 1
N
t θ +  Cognitive  skill  () 1
C
t θ +  
  Stage 1 Stage 2  Stage 3  Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3
Lagged noncognitive skill, ()
N
t θ   0.9849 0.9383 0.7570 0.0216 0.0076 0.0005 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Lagged cognitive skill, ( )
C
t θ   0.1442 -0.1259 0.1171  0.9197 0.8845 0.9099 
  (0.120) (0.115) (0.115) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019)
Parental investment, ()
I
t θ   0.0075 0.0149 0.0064 0.0056 0.0018 0.0019 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Maternal education, S  0.0005 -0.0004 0.0019 -0.0003 0.0007 0.0001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Maternal cognitive skill, A  0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0019 0.0025 0.0002 0.0010 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
   Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Cognitive skills are proxied by PIAT math and
reading. Noncognitive skills are proxied by the components of the behavioral problem
index. Investments are proxied by components of the home score. Stage 1 is age 6{7 to
8{9; Stage 2 is 8{9 to 10{11; Stage 3 is 10{11 to 12{13. Source: Cunha & Heckman (2008,
Table 11).
The estimated eects of a 10% increase in investment are reported in Table 2 (right panel
for earnings and left panel for high school graduation). Increasing investment in the rst stage
by 10% increases adult earnings by 0.25%. The increase operates equally through cognitive and
noncognitive skills. Ten percent investment increments in the second stage have a larger eect
(0.3%) but mainly operate through improving noncognitive skills. Investment in the third stage
has weaker eects and operates primarily through its eect on noncognitive skills.
For high school graduation (see left panel, Table 2), the eects are more substantial and
operate relatively more strongly through cognitive skills rather than through noncognitive skills.
The sensitive stage for the production of earnings is stage 2. The sensitive stage for producing
secondary school graduation is stage 1. This reects the dierential dependence of the outcomes on
the two capabilities and the greater productivity of investment in noncognitive skills in the second
period compared to other periods. This evidence is consistent with other evidence that shows the
greater malleability of noncognitive skills at later ages.29
29See Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, & Masterov (2006), Cunha & Heckman (2007), and Heckman (2008) for a
discussion of this evidence.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 20
Table 2: Percentage Impact of an Exogenous Increase by 10% in Investments of Dierent Periods for Two
Dierent Anchors White Males, CNLSY/79
                           

























Period 1  Period 1   
0.2487 0.1247  0.1240 0.6441  0.5480  0.0961 
(0.0302) (0.0151)  (0.0150) (0.0789)  (0.0672)  (0.0118) 
Period 2  Period 2   
0.3065 0.0445  0.2620 0.3980  0.1951  0.2029 
(0.0358) (0.0052)  (0.0306) (0.0466)  (0.0229)  (0.0238) 
Period 3  Period 3   
0.2090 0.0540  0.1550 0.3565  0.2366  0.1198 
(0.0230) (0.0059)  (0.0170) (0.0389)  (0.0258)  (0.0131) 
 
Note. From Cunha & Heckman (2008, Table 17). Standard errors in parentheses.
Measurement Error
Accounting for measurement error substantially aects estimates of the technology of skill
formation. This evidence sounds a note of caution for the burgeoning literature that regresses wages
on psychological measurements. The share of error variance for proxies of cognition, personality, and
investment ranges from 30% to 70%. Not accounting for measurement error produces downward-
biased estimates of self-productivity eects and perverse estimates of investment eects.30
Estimates from Nonlinear Technologies
Cunha, Heckman, & Schennach (2010) estimate nonlinear technologies to identify key sub-
stitution parameters.31 The ability to substitute critically aects the design of strategies for reme-
diation and early intervention.
Cunha, Heckman, & Schennach (2010) estimate a version of technology (12) for general

j
l, j 2 fC;Ng, l 2 f1;:::;Lg using the same sample as used by Cunha & Heckman (2008).32
They estimate a two-stage model of childhood (L = 2). Stage 1 is birth through age 4. Stage 2
corresponds to age 5 through 14.
The major ndings from their analysis are: (a) Self-productivity becomes stronger as children
become older, for both cognitive and noncognitive capability formation. (b) Complementarity
between cognitive skills and investment becomes stronger as children become older. The elasticity
of substitution for cognitive inputs is smaller in second-stage production.33 It is more dicult to
compensate for the eects of adverse environments on cognitive endowments at later ages than it
is at earlier ages. This nding helps to explain the evidence on ineective cognitive remediation
30See Cunha & Heckman (2008), Table 14.
31They also account for measurement error and endogeneity of family inputs.
32They establish semiparametric identication of their model, including measurement equations.
33It is 1.5 in the rst stage and .56 in the second stage. The estimates are precisely determined.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 21
strategies for disadvantaged adolescents. (c) Complementarity between noncognitive skills and
investments becomes weaker as children become older. It is easier at later stages of childhood to
remediate early disadvantage using investments in noncognitive skills.34
Cunha, Heckman, & Schennach (2010) report that 34% of the variation in educational attain-
ment in their sample is explained by the measures of cognitive and noncognitive capabilities that
they use.35 Sixteen percent is due to adolescent cognitive capabilities. 12% is due to adolescent
noncognitive capabilities.36 Measured parental investments account for 15% of the variation in
educational attainment. These estimates suggest that the measures of cognitive and noncognitive
capabilities that they use are powerful, but not exclusive, determinants of educational attainment
and that other factors, besides the measures of family investment that they use, are at work in
explaining variation in educational attainment.
Lessons for the Design of Policies
To examine the implications of the estimates of Cunha, Heckman, & Schennach (2010),
consider two social planning problems that can be solved from knowledge of the technology of
capability formation and without knowledge of parental preferences and parental access to lending
markets. The rst problem we consider determines the cost of investment required to produce
high school attainment for children with dierent initial endowments of their own and parental
capabilities. For the same distribution of endowments, the second problem determines optimal
allocations of investments from a xed budget to maximize aggregate schooling for a cohort of
children. We also consider a version of the social planning problem that minimizes aggregate
crime.























and let G(1;h) be its distribution. We draw H people from
the initial distribution G(1;h) that is estimated by Cunha, Heckman, & Schennach (2010). The
price of investment is assumed to be the same in each period, and is set at unity.
The criterion adopted for the rst problem assumes that the goal of society is to get the
schooling of every child to a 12th grade level. The required investments measure the power of
initial endowments in determining inequality and the compensation through investment required
to eliminate their inuence. Let v(1;h) be the minimum cost of attaining 12 years of schooling for
a child with endowment 1;h. Assuming a zero discount rate, v(1;h) is formally dened by
v (1;h) = minfI1;h + I2;hg
34The elasticity of substitution is .54 in the rst stage and .77 in the second stage. The estimates are precisely
determined.
35These are the same measures as used in Cunha & Heckman (2008) which we previously discussed.
36The skills are correlated so the marginal contributions of each skill do not add up to 34%.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 22






= 12 where S maps end-of-childhood capabilities











for k 2 fC;Ng and t 2 f1;2g;
and the initial endowments of the child and her parents. Cunha, Heckman, & Schennach (2010)
estimate all of the ingredients needed to perform this calculation. We summarize some of their
ndings here.
Figure 3 plots the percentage increase in investment over that required for a child with mean
parental and personal endowments to attain high school graduation. In analyzing the investment
required for child endowments, we set parental endowments at mean values. Lighter values corre-
spond to larger numbers. Eighty percent more investment is required for children with the most
disadvantaged personal endowments. The negative percentages shown in Figure 3 for children with
high initial endowments is a measure of their advantage.37 The empirical analysis of Moon (2010)
shows that investments received as a function of a child's endowments are typically in reverse or-
der from what is required to attain the goal of universal high school graduation. Children born
with advantageous endowments typically receive more parental investment than children from less
advantaged environments.
A more standard social planner's problem maximizes aggregate human capital subject to
a budget constraint B. We draw H children from the initial distribution G(1;h), and solve the
problem of how to allocate nite resources B to maximize the average education of the cohort.
Formally, the social planner maximizes aggregate per capita schooling











subject to the aggregate budget constraint,
H X
h=1











for k 2 fC;Ng and t 2 f1;2g;
and the initial conditions of the child. Solving this problem, we obtain optimal early and late
investments, I1;h and I2;h, respectively, for each child h. An analogous social planning problem is
used to allocate investments to minimize crime.
37The corresponding gure for children with the most disadvantaged parental endowments is 95%. See Cunha,
Heckman, & Schennach (2010).INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 23





























Percentage Increase in Total Investments as a Function of 
Child Initial Conditions of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skills
Standard Deviations from the Mean of the
Initial Distribution of Child Cognitive Skill
Standard Deviations from the Mean of the
Initial Distribution of Child Noncognitive Skill
Figure 4 shows the prole of early (graph on left) and late (graph on right) investment as
a function of endowments. For the most disadvantaged, the optimal policy is to invest a lot in
the early years. The decline in investment by level of initial advantage is substantial for early
investment. Second-period investment proles are much atter and slightly favor more advantaged
children. This is a manifestation of the dynamic complementarity that produces an equity-eciency
trade-o for later stage investment but not for early investment. It is socially optimal to invest
more in the second period of the lives of advantaged children than in disadvantaged children. A
similar prole emerges for investments to reduce aggregate crime.38
The optimal ratio of early-to-late investment depends on the desired outcome, the endow-
ments of children and budget B. Figure 5 plots the density of the ratio of early-to-late investment
for education and crime derived by Cunha, Heckman, & Schennach (2010).39 Whereas educational
attainment depends strongly on cognitive skills, participation in criminal activities are aected
strongly by noncognitive skills. Because compensation for adversity in noncognitive skills is less
costly in the second period than in the rst period, while the opposite is true for cognitive skills, it
is optimal to weight rst-period and second-period investments in the directions indicated in the
gure. For most congurations of disadvantage, we have that the optimal policy to invest relatively
38See Cunha, Heckman, & Schennach (2010). They report investment proles similar to those displayed in Figure 4
when they plot optimal investment against parental endowments.
39The optimal policy is not identical for each h and depends on 1;h, which varies in the population. The densities
reect this variation.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 24
Figure 4. Optimal early (left) and late (right) investments by child initial conditions of cognitive and
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more in the early years, compared to the later years.
These simulations suggest that the timing and level of optimal interventions for disadvantaged
children depend on the conditions of disadvantage and the nature of desired outcomes.40 Targeted
strategies are likely to be eective, especially so if dierent targets weight cognitive and noncognitive
traits dierently.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper reviews the evidence from recent research that addresses the origins of inequality
and the evolution of the capabilities that partly determine inequality. Both cognitive and noncog-
nitive capabilities are important in producing a variety of outcomes. An emerging literature relates
psychological measurements of personality and cognition to economic preference parameters and
extends conventional preference specications in economics.
Comparative advantage is an empirically important feature of economic and social life. The
same bundle of personal traits has dierent productivity in dierent tasks. Recent empirical work
on the technology of capability formation provides an operational empirical framework. Capabilities
are not invariant traits and are causally aected by parental investment. Genes and environments
interact to determine outcomes. The technology of capability formation rationalizes a large body
of evidence in economics, psychology, and neuroscience. Capabilities are self-productive and cross-
40See Cunha, Heckman, & Schennach (2010) for an extensive discussion of these and other simulations.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 25
Figure 5. Densities of ratio of early to late investments maximizing aggregate education versus minimizing
aggregate crime.
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FIGURE 5.—Ratio of early to late investments by maternal cognitive and noncognitive skills
maximizing aggregate education (left) and minimizing aggregate crime (right) (other endow-
ments held at mean levels).
FIGURE 6.—Densities of ratio of early to late investments maximizing aggregate education
versus minimizing aggregate crime. productive. Dynamic complementarity explains why it is productive to invest in the cognitive skills
of disadvantaged young children but why the payos are so low for cognitive investments in disad-
vantaged older children and are even lower for disadvantaged adults. There is no equity-eciency
trade-o for investment in the capabilities of young disadvantaged children. There is a substantial
equity-eciency trade-o for investment in the cognitive skills of disadvantaged adolescents and
adults. The trade-o is much less dramatic for investment in the noncognitive skills of adolescents.
Parental environments and investments aect the outcomes of children. There are substantial
costs to uninhibited libertarianism in one generation if the preferences and well-being of the next
generation are ignored.41
The preferences, motivations, and skill endowments of adults that are created, in part, in
their childhoods play important roles in creating inequality. They can be inuenced, in part, by
policy. But incentives matter too. Society can reduce crime and promote well-being by operating
at both incentive and investment margins.
The right mix of intervention to reduce inequality and promote productivity remains to be
41See Moynihan (2006).INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 26
determined. The optimal timing of investment depends on the outcome being targeted. The
optimal intervention strategies depend on the stage of the life cycle and endowments at each stage.
For severely disadvantaged adults with low levels of capabilities, subsidizing work and welfare
may be a better response for alleviating poverty than investment in their skills. The substantial
heterogeneity in endowments and eects of interventions at dierent ages suggests that a universal
policy to combat the adverse eects of early disadvantage is not appropriate. Optimal investment
should be tailored to the specics that create adversity and to the productivity of investment for
dierent congurations of disadvantage. As research on the economics of capability formation
matures, economists will have a greater understanding of how to foster successful people.INVESTING IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 27
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